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NOTES
PARTING THE CHEVRON SEA: AN ARGUMENT
FOR CHEVRON’S GREATER APPLICABILITY TO
CABINET THAN INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Andrew T. Bond*
While Chevron in fact involved an interpretive regulation, the rationale of the
case was not limited to that context: “‘The power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation
of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’” Quite appropriately, therefore, we have accorded Chevron deference not only
to agency regulations, but to authoritative agency positions set forth in a variety of
other formats.
—Justice Scalia, Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following cases over three different administrations and
decades:
Under the presidency of Bill Clinton, the Department of Veterans
Affairs instituted a compensatory regulation requiring claimants to prove
that their disabilities resulted from negligent treatment by the Department of
Veterans Affairs or that aggravation of previous disabilities occurred during
treatment.1 The Supreme Court unanimously held that the regulation was
inconsistent with the controlling statute, which did not contain any requirement that veterans must prove fault attributable to the Department of Veterans Affairs in causing such injuries.2
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.B.A., University of
Wisconsin, 2011. I thank Professor Pojanowski for his guidance and instruction. I also
thank my family and members of Volume 90 of the Notre Dame Law Review for their support
and dedication. All errors are my own.
1 Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 116 (1994).
2 Id. at 122. Congress later amended the statute in question to essentially overturn
the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Gardner. See, e.g., Spigner v. Shinseki, 474 F.
397
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Under the presidency of George W. Bush, the State of Oregon brought
an action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to prevent federal enforcement of the U.S. Attorney General’s interpretive rule that physicians who assist the suicide of terminally ill patients under the Oregon Death
with Dignity Act violate the Federal Controlled Substances Act.3 The
Supreme Court invalidated the Attorney General’s rule.4 Justice Scalia filed
a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.5
Under the presidency of Barack Obama, several Medicare providers
brought suit against the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services, challenging the Department’s reimbursement adjustment for hospitals within the providers’ networks that serve a disproportionate share of lowincome patients.6 The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Department’s reimbursement adjustment methodology.7
These cases highlight the daily task of cabinet agencies8 to make highly
contentious and politically charged policy choices against the backdrop of
ambiguous congressional legislation. Just as the judiciary must fulfill its Marbury v. Madison function to “say what the law is,”9 cabinet agencies must fulfill
their Chevron function to interpret frequently vague and general statutes
enacted by Congress.10 This challenge, in many ways, is the key legal question of our time: has the judiciary’s ability to say what the law is been usurped
by the executive’s ability to do the same?11
Cabinet department decisions to “say what the law is,” at their core, are
policy decisions. While the Supreme Court gives independent and cabinet
agencies Chevron deference under certain circumstances, it seems as though
cabinet agencies are inherently a more natural “fit” for receiving Chevron
deference.12
This Note argues that cabinet agencies are better suited to receive Chevron deference than independent agencies because voters should desire such
policy decisions to be made by those closest to electoral accountability, rather
App’x 763, 765 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Moreover, § 1151 has been amended substantially in
response to the decision in Gardner . . . ‘The legislative history is clear that the change [in
§ 1151] was generated to overturn the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Gardner.’”) (citations omitted).
3 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250 (2006).
4 Id. at 274–75.
5 Id. at 275.
6 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 821 (2013).
7 Id. at 828–29.
8 See infra notes 83–92 and accompanying text (discussing how to define “cabinet
agencies”).
9 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
10 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
11 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115
YALE L.J. 2580, 2610 (2006) (“[I]t is emphatically the province and duty of the executive
branch to say what the law is.”).
12 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL109.txt

2014]

unknown

parting the

Seq: 3

CHEVRON

sea

2-DEC-14

8:51

399

than unelected Article III judges with life-tenure.13 In other words, the judiciary should accept the countermajoritarian difficulty as fundamentally true
and review cabinet agency decisions in light of Chevron deference.14 Part I
examines the revolutionary decision of Chevron and its aftermath. Central to
Part I is an inquiry into whether Chevron should be applied on a case-by-case
or across-the-board basis, and whether Chevron has usurped the judiciary’s
power to “say what the law is,” as cemented by the cornerstone constitutional
law case of Marbury v. Madison. This Note contends that Chevron deference
should be applied across-the-board, and that Chevron and Marbury are not at
odds, but rather compatible precedents for the courts.
Part II defines what constitutes “cabinet” agencies in the scope of this
discussion. Defining what constitutes a cabinet agency, in practice, is a difficult distinction. Part III turns to Chevron’s greater applicability (or inapplicability, as advanced by several critics) to cabinet agencies than independent
agencies. Fundamental to Part III is both a theoretical and practical justification for why cabinet agencies are better suited for Chevron deference.
I. THE CHEVRON DECISION

AND

ITS AFTERMATH

Part I briefly summarizes the Supreme Court’s pivotal decision in Chevron. It then looks at the decision’s decades-long aftermath, including
whether Chevron should be applied in a case-by-case or across-the-board fashion. This Part concludes with an inquiry into whether Chevron undermined
the judiciary’s power, per Marbury v. Madison, to “say what the law is.”
A.

The Chevron Decision

The dispute presented in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. revolved around the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
definition of “stationary source” under the Clean Air Act.15 The EPA exercised its power of informal rulemaking and adopted a liberal interpretation
of “stationary source” (“liberal” as in a view more favorable to the energy
industry).16 The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), in addition to
other groups, petitioned the D.C. Court of Appeals to review the EPA’s inter13 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
14 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) (“The root
difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”).
15 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (2012). While the Act defined what the term “major stationary
source” meant in relation to the Clean Air Act, it failed to clarify what “stationary source”
means in itself. Id.
16 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans
and Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14,
1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50 and 51). As it turns out, the EPA initially decided
to utilize a more “conservative” interpretation of “stationary source,” but the agency
changed its view and went through the process of informal rulemaking a second time in
order to alter its interpretation of the amended Clean Air Act.
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pretative rule defining “stationary source.”17 The Court of Appeals found
the statute18 and legislative history19 to be inconclusive as to the definition of
a “stationary source.” It also held that the EPA’s interpretation of “stationary
source” was at odds with the general “purpose” of the Clean Air Act.20 The
court declared the regulation inconsistent with Congress’s purpose in enacting the Clean Air Act and vacated the EPA’s regulation.21
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court overturned the decision of
the Court of Appeals.22 Justice Stevens stated that once the Court of Appeals
determined that Congress did not have a clear intent with regard to the
EPA’s lenient view of what constitutes a “stationary source,”23 the Court of
Appeals should not have asked, “whether in its view the concept is ‘inappropriate’ in the general context of a program designed to improve air quality.”24 Instead, the correct question was “whether the Administrator’s view
that it is appropriate in the context of this particular program is a reasonable
one.”25 This inquiry underlies what would become known as Chevron’s twostep framework.
Justice Stevens articulated a two-step framework with which courts
should analyze the actions of an agency when its interpretation of a statute is
in question. The first step is for the court to consider “whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”26 If Congress’s intent is
clear, then the court (and the agency) must “give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”27 This would be the end of the judicial
inquiry, and the court need not enter into step two of the framework.
If, however, Congress’s intent is not clear, “the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation.”28 This second step of the
framework is where the Court of Appeals erred. If the statute is ambiguous
or silent with regard to the issue at question, then the “question for the court
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”29
17 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d
sub nom. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
18 685 F.2d at 723.
19 Id. at 726.
20 Id. at 726–28.
21 Id.
22 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (“In light of these well-settled principles it is clear that the
Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at
issue.”).
23 Id. at 860.
24 Id. at 845.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 842.
27 Id. at 843.
28 Id. (footnote omitted).
29 Id. The word “permissible” is synonymous with the word “reasonableness” for purposes of the opinion. Id. at 863.
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To summarize, the basic holding of Chevron is fairly straightforward:
“Step One” requires courts to determine if Congress has “directly spoken to
the precise question at issue.”30 If Congress has directly spoken, that is the
end of the judicial inquiry, and Congress’s interpretation governs. However,
if Congress has not directly spoken, then “Step Two” directs courts to ask
whether the agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction
of the statute.”31 If the construction is permissible (or reasonable), then the
court must uphold the agency’s interpretation.
Justice Stevens’s articulation of the two-step framework is broad and not
constrained to the precise facts of the case at hand.32 Even though the
framework seems simple in the abstract, its application across the several
decades that have followed since Chevron has been anything but
straightforward.
B. Chevron’s Aftermath
The decades after Chevron have resulted in the application of the case’s
two-step framework in a fairly inconsistent fashion. Indeed, the dilemma of
Chevron seems to center around two distinct questions: (i) when does Chevron
govern the case at issue (the so-called “Chevron Step Zero”),33 and (ii)
whether Chevron deference should be a case-by-case inquiry (as advanced by
Justice Breyer)34 or an across-the-board presumption (as argued by Justice
30 Id. at 842.
31 Id. at 843.
32 Justice Scalia often reminds the Supreme Court, albeit in concurring and dissenting
opinions, that the two-step framework in Chevron was written in broad language and not
cabined to specific contextual circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 256 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To decide the present case, I would adhere to
the original formulation of Chevron. ‘The power of an administrative agency to administer
a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and
the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’”) (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2000) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“While Chevron in fact involved an interpretive regulation, the rationale of
the case was not limited to that context: “‘The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy
and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’”) (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
33 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
836 (2001) (“Together, these principles comprise what might be called ‘step zero’ in the
Chevron doctrine: the inquiry that must be made in deciding whether courts should turn to
the Chevron framework at all, as opposed to the Skidmore framework or deciding the interpretational issue de novo.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 247
(2006) (describing Step Zero as “the inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies
at all”).
34 See generally Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN.
L. REV. 363, 397–98 (1986) (arguing for a case-by-case Chevron presumption).
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Scalia).35 These questions are intimately related and will be discussed in
turn.
1.

Chevron Step Zero

Chevron’s “Step Zero” inquiry deals with the question that courts ask
before arriving at the two-step framework: does Chevron even apply to the
case at issue?36 If the answer is yes, then the court’s analysis proceeds as it
did in Chevron itself. If, however, the answer is no, then courts typically apply
the Skidmore v. Swift & Co. standard, or even engage in de novo review.37
Skidmore’s approach considers the “rulings, interpretations and opinions” of
agencies to be “not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority.”38 Additionally, the weight that courts place on the judgments of agencies “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control.”39 Skidmore is certainly a less deferential standard of review for
agencies than that articulated in Chevron. Skidmore’s approach both makes it
harder for the agency’s interpretation to govern and increases the odds that
a judicial construction of the statute at hand will govern. The substantial
disparity in the level of deference the Skidmore standard affords agencies
should give one pause in comparison to the seemingly broad holding of
Chevron, and the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review.40
The potential ambiguity in applying Chevron’s Step Zero came to a head
in United States v. Mead Corp.41 At issue in Mead was the legality of a tariff
clarification ruling by the U.S. Customs Service.42 The Supreme Court
began its analysis by distinguishing between cases that are entitled to Chevron’s two-step framework and those that are entitled only to the less deferential Skidmore standard.43 In so holding, the Court seems to imply that Step
Zero involves asking if Congress “would expect the agency to be able to speak
with the force of law.”44 If yes, then the Chevron framework governs. If not,
then the Skidmore framework governs.
35 See generally Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520–21 (advocating for an across-the-board Chevron presumption).
36 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (articulating a standard of review
for agency decisions in the face of congressional ambiguity less favorable than the
approach in Chevron).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 BICKEL, supra note 14, at 16.
41 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
42 Id.
43 Id. (“We agree that a tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under
Chevron, there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force
of law, but we hold that under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the ruling is
eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness.”).
44 Id. at 229.
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Mead raises the question as to why the Court found the need to revitalize
Skidmore, a case decided in 1944 it could easily have left for dead after its
decision in Chevron. In deciding not to do so, the Court complicated the
Chevron framework by adding a wrinkle to the pivotal “Step Zero.” Mead gave
two clues as to when Chevron deference is appropriate: first, “express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication
that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed” and second, a “relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such
force.”45 Even with these clues, it is difficult to discern the underlying force
between the distinction (of when to apply Chevron or Skidmore deference)
articulated in Mead and the scope of its holding.46 Parsing the precise holding and greater importance of Mead is outside the scope of this Note, but it is
important to observe that Mead exemplifies a division within the Court after
Chevron: how readily should the judiciary apply the two-step framework?
2.

Case-by-Case vs. Across-the-Board Approach

Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia offer two contrasting points of view as to
the depth and breadth of Chevron.47 Both agree, however, that Chevron is
properly understood as a judicial framework that serves as a conduit for what
Congress wants.48 Post-Chevron, Congress knows that if it leaves ambiguous
language in statutes, it is implicitly deferring to agencies to work through
those ambiguities.49 The legislature also knows that the judiciary will defer
45 Id. at 229–30.
46 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2603 (“For the future, Mead should not be taken to
establish anything like a presumption against Chevron-style deference in cases in which the
agency has not proceeded through formal procedures. Instead Mead should be seen as an
unusual case in an exceedingly unusual setting . . . .”); cf. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and
Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 799, 805 (2010) (“Accordingly, many scholars, including those who think deference should be justified by administrative expertise, concluded after Mead that deference turns on a general congressional
delegation of lawmaking power to agencies . . . .” (footnote omitted)). Several scholars
also note the chaos and confusion that Mead’s “force of law” test causes. See, e.g., William S.
Jordan III, Judicial Review of Informal Statutory Interpretations: The Answer is Chevron Step Two,
Not Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 719, 719–20 (2002) (arguing that Mead’s force
of law test has caused “chaos” by creating a “cumbersome, unworkable regime under which
courts must draw increasingly fine distinctions using impossibly vague standards”).
47 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
48 This observation is supported by the very text of the Chevron opinion itself. Justice
Stevens began “Step One” of the Chevron framework by explicitly looking to congressional
actions: “First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
49 Congressional reliance on the straightforward framework of Chevron is, of course,
muddled by the Court’s decision in Mead. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
This complexity of when Chevron governs serves as at least a partial impetus for the debate
between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia over Chevron’s breadth and depth.
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to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.50 Alternatively, if Congress prefers not to leave room for agencies to shape the meaning of a law, it can either draft a more precise statute or amend the statute to
“overrule” an agency’s interpretation.51 At the end of the day, Congress is
still very much in the driver’s seat with respect to agency delegation.
Although Justices Breyer and Scalia agree on the theoretical underpinning of Chevron, their opinions diverge with regard to Chevron’s greater
importance and applicability. This difference requires careful examination
and also serves as an important philosophical backdrop for whether Chevron
applies more to cabinet than independent agencies.
Justice Breyer’s primary argument for a case-by-case approach to Chevron
is articulated in his 1986 essay, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, by
then-Judge Breyer serving on the First Circuit.52 Justice Breyer’s basic claim
is that judicial review of agency interpretations should be “tailor[ed] [to the
judiciary’s] institutional capacities and strengths.”53 The kind of case-by-case
approach he advocates seems directly at odds with the broad language of
Chevron’s holding,54 but stems from an interest in cabining the Chevron
framework to fewer instances of judicial review.
This approach comes from a fundamental disagreement with the proposition that when Congress legislates via ambiguous statutes it does so
against a backdrop expectation that agencies will fill in the gaps.55 Instead,
Justice Breyer views the judicial inquiry to be more complicated: “[Courts]
have looked to practical features of the particular circumstance to decide
whether it ‘makes sense,’ in terms of the need for fair and efficient administration of that statute in light of its substantive purpose, to imply a congressional intent that courts defer to the agency’s interpretation.”56 He goes on
to say that there is “nothing new in the law for a court to imagine what a
hypothetically ‘reasonable’ legislator would have wanted (given the statute’s
objective) as an interpretive method of understanding a statutory term surrounded by silence.”57 In sum, Justice Breyer states “there is no reason why
one could not apply these general principles . . . to the question of the extent
to which Congress intended that courts should defer to the agency’s view of
the proper interpretation.”58 If one accepts Justice Breyer’s principles and
conclusion as true, it is not difficult to see why a case-by-case application of
50 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
51 It is, of course, an unrealistic view to expect Congress to precisely draft every statute.
With that admission in mind, the option of Congress to go back and amend statutes to
overrule agency interpretations likely does more work here.
52 Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
397–98 (1986) (arguing for a case-by-case approach to Chevron deference).
53 Id. at 398.
54 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
55 See supra note 48–49 and accompanying text.
56 Breyer, supra note 52, at 370.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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Chevron makes sense: the correct result depends upon what a “reasonable”
legislator thought she was doing at the time the statute was enacted.59
Justice Breyer then proceeds to apply his generally articulated principles
as to why Chevron deference should be judicially administered on a case-bycase basis. First, Justice Breyer states that applying Chevron in an across-theboard method would simply be insufficient to capture the wide array of issues
in which agencies interpret ambiguous congressional statutes: “To read Chevron as laying down a blanket rule, applicable to all agency interpretations of
law, such as ‘always defer to the agency when the statute is silent,’ would be
seriously overbroad, counterproductive and sometimes senseless.”60 Second,
Justice Breyer recognizes that a potential outcome of applying the Chevron
framework will be to remand a case back to the agency in order for it to
provide a “reasonable” interpretation.61 This, to Justice Breyer, would be a
“waste of time”: “What, then, does the court expect the agency to learn about
the statute that the court does not already know?”62 Third, Justice Breyer
contends an across-the-board approach to Chevron would “ask[ ] judges to
develop a cast of mind that often is psychologically difficult to maintain,” as a
judge could believe an agency’s interpretation is both reasonable and legally
inaccurate at the same time.63
To summarize, Justice Breyer believes that Chevron is properly viewed as
a tool courts may use to better discern the legislative intent of Congress at the
time it enacted a statute, but not as an across-the-board presumption that
defers to any reasonable agency interpretation. This characterization of
Chevron is a formidable one, and certainly mirrors the judicial approach to
agency interpretations pre-Chevron.64 However, as Justice Scalia contends, it
is inevitably a flawed position.
Justice Scalia’s primary argument for an across-the-board approach to
Chevron is articulated in his 1989 essay, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law.65 As previously noted, Justice Scalia has a similar view to
Justice Breyer of the underpinnings of pre-Chevron jurisprudence and the
59 Justice Breyer notes that Congress, in the face of statutory ambiguity, likely intended
to delegate highly technical questions to agencies. Id. If, on the other hand, statutory
ambiguities raise a “major” or “important” question, it is unlikely Congress intended to
delegate this kind of power to agencies: “Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and
answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the
course of the statute’s daily administration.” Id.
60 Id. at 373.
61 See id. at 370.
62 Id. at 378.
63 Id. at 379.
64 Indeed, Justice Scalia agrees with Justice Breyer’s characterization of pre-Chevron
jurisprudence, although he disagrees with his post-Chevron viewpoint: “Chevron, however,
if it is to be believed, replaced this statute-by-statute evaluation (which was assuredly a font
of uncertainty and litigation) with an across-the-board presumption that, in the case of
ambiguity, agency discretion is meant.” Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989).
65 Id. at 521 (arguing for an across-the-board approach to Chevron deference).
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Chevron decision itself, but significantly differs in the framework’s application. While Justice Breyer views Chevron as an incremental step to compliment previous administrative deference jurisprudence, Justice Scalia views
Chevron as a fundamental rethinking of the judiciary’s proper role in interpreting agency deference.
Justice Scalia concedes Justice Breyer’s point that Chevron is not an errorless framework, and that it potentially does not perfectly capture Congress’s
“presumed intent,”66 but counters by laying the foundation for an across-theboard approach. He writes: “[A]ny rule adopted in this field represents
merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally as a background
rule of law against which Congress can legislate. If that is the principal function to be served, Chevron is unquestionably better than what preceded it.”67
Justice Scalia goes on to state, “Congress now knows that the ambiguities it
creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the
bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular
agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.”68 He acknowledges
that Chevron is perhaps not a flawless framework, but that it provides Congress with a consistent and predictable background of judicial philosophy by
which it may legislate and reasonably ascertain the potential judicial outcomes of its choice to include ambiguities or avoid them.69
In sum, Justice Scalia contends that the Chevron framework provides
Congress a known and consistent judicial process against which Congress is
able to draft statutes however ambiguously or unambiguously it pleases. Any
potential litigation of agency interpretations of those statutes will return predictable judicial outcomes under the Chevron two-step framework.
While there is merit to Justice Breyer’s case-by-case approach to Chevron,
Justice Scalia’s approach should be favored, not for its oft-noted “simplicity,”70 but rather its more accurate portrayal of how the government pragmatically functions. If one accepts that interpretive decisions of ambiguous
statutes are, at their core, policy determinations, then the judiciary must recognize and respect that decisions of policy are not decisions of law, and therefore, their proper place is within the elected branches of government.
Indeed, this is the heart of the countermajoritarian difficulty that the judiciary must confront and take seriously.71
Justice Scalia’s approach accounts for these interests better than that of
Justice Breyer as it both more accurately respects the countermajoritarian
66 Id. at 517.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 The Chevron framework seems to be unfairly attacked as “simplistic.” While the
framework itself is indeed simplistic from the perspective of judicial implementation, the
policy issues that Chevron may be applied to are nothing but simplistic. Indeed, these may
be the hardest questions that any branch of government may face. It is for that reason that
such decisions should be left to the electable and accountable branches of government,
not the judiciary.
71 BICKEL, supra note 14, at 16.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL109.txt

2014]

unknown

parting the

CHEVRON

Seq: 11

sea

2-DEC-14

8:51

407

dilemma and provides Congress with a more reliable background against
which to legislate. After all, reliable decisions under the Chevron framework
across different administrations cannot be decisions of policy, but must be
decisions of law. This is the judiciary’s proper role.
3.

Did Chevron Usurp Marbury v. Madison?

If Justice Scalia’s across-the-board approach is superior to Justice
Breyer’s case-by-case approach to Chevron deference, as this Note advocates,72
then the next inquiry must be whether Chevron is at odds with Marbury v.
Madison, the cornerstone of constitutional caselaw.73 Many critics argue that
Marbury and Chevron are indeed inconsistent, and continue to coexist on a
potentially unsustainable, long-term trajectory.74 If this proposition is true,
which this Note will argue it is not, then the application of Chevron deference
to cabinet agencies over independent agencies would be a troublesome usurpation of power from the judicial to the executive branch.75 This Note will
contend that Chevron and Marbury are not at odds, but are instead compatible cases that both support the across-the-board Chevron presumption of
deference.
72 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
73 See supra note 9 and accompany text.
74 See John M. Dempsey, Administrative Law: Michigan Sides with Marbury, Not Chevron,
on Agency Deference, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 3, 5 (2009) (“The Michigan Supreme
Court . . . invoked Marbury v. Madison and the Michigan Constitution to find that agency
interpretations of law are not binding on the courts.” (citations omitted)); Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2637 (2003) (“Chevron’s command to
courts to defer to certain reasonable agency interpretations of statutes is superficially an
uneasy fit with the declaration in Marbury v. Madison that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’” (citations omitted)); Harold
M. Greenberg, Why Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes Should be Subject to Stare Decisis,
79 TENN. L. REV. 573, 604 (2012) (“[E]ven if the coexistence of the Chevron and Marbury
conventions is not by itself problematic, the Judiciary’s inability to signal which convention
applies is.” (citations omitted)); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1262 (2002) (“The concern among scholars and judges that Chevron
may have gone too far in relinquishing judicial authority—and their corresponding efforts
to reinvigorate the judicial role—may be motivated in part by an underlying sense that
Chevron’s surrender of power is at odds with Marbury’s declaration that the ‘judicial Power’
under Article III includes the power to ‘say what the law is’ . . . .” (citations omitted)); Jim
Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2001) (“Since it was decided in 1984, Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.—a case commonly associated with strong deference
to agency interpretations of law—has taken on canonical status as the ‘counter-Marbury’
for the administrative state.” (citations omitted)).
75 See Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 743 (2007) (“Chevron vastly expanded the scope of agency lawmaking
and interpretive power. In doing so, Chevron changed the political landscape by redistributing interpretative power from the Judiciary to the Executive.”).
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Marbury firmly cemented the judiciary’s role of judicial review against
the backdrop of the separation of powers under the Constitution. In 1803,
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: “It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”76 In so doing, he essentially transformed the judiciary into the final arbiter of the meaning of the
Constitution. Allowing the judicial branch this power makes intuitive sense
from a separation of powers perspective, as to allow the executive branch to
both execute and decide the meaning of the Constitution would lead to
unchecked power.77 Instead, Marbury tasks the judiciary with being a dispassionate observer, free from political pressure and accountability, in its effort
to determine the meaning of the Constitution.78 This is the judiciary’s greatest strength, but also its highest point of fragility.79
If one starts with the baseline of Marbury’s holding, it is not difficult to
see how the judiciary’s role as the final arbiter of the Constitution could lead
to its ancillary role as the final arbiter of ambiguous statutes.80 This logical
inference, however, would put Marbury at odds with Chevron and, additionally, be a venerable argument against applying Chevron deference to cabinet
agencies.
Instead, the proper way to view Chevron’s impact is to contextualize the
case as one that upheld the judiciary’s power to say what the law is (but to
cabin its ability to draft judicial legislation and policy), while staying true to
the tenant of judicial review as articulated by Marbury. Indeed, judicial
review of agency decisions remains more strenuous than that of congressional or executive actions, given the baseline Step One inquiry of Chevron.81
The Chevron decision presents a pragmatic and consistent two-step
framework by which the judiciary can review agency interpretations of statutes. The Supreme Court’s decision in Mead unnecessarily complicated the
inquiry as to when the Chevron two-step framework should be applied. However, such added complexity raises the question whether Chevron deference
should be applied on a case-by-case or across-the-board approach. The
across-the-board approach Justice Scalia articulated is the more persuasive of
the two, due not merely to its simplicity, but rather its more accurate view of
how our government functions on a day-to-day basis.
When the across-the-board approach to Chevron is viewed against the
backdrop of Marbury, it can be seen that Chevron vindicates the traditional
76 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
77 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2584 (“Why is the executive not permitted to construe constitutional ambiguities as it sees fit? The simplest answer is that foxes are not
permitted to guard henhouses, or, in other words, those who are limited by law cannot
decide on the scope of the limitation.”).
78 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 14 and 71 and accompany text.
80 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2585 (“It should be easy to see how this view might be
transplanted to the arena of ordinary statutory law. Perhaps statutory law has the same
relationship to the executive as the Constitution has to the government in general.”).
81 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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role of judicial review.82 Judges are still called upon to “say what the law is,”
but are cabined from creating judicial policy that could oversee administrative agencies. Under Chevron, when Congress is silent and the agency speaks,
the decision is one of policy, not law, and therefore most appropriately left to
the branches accountable to the electorate.
II. DEFINING “CABINET” AGENCIES
Prior to engaging in the assessment of whether cabinet agencies are
more entitled to Chevron deference than independent agencies, we must first
differentiate the two. It seems common in today’s lexicon to refer to those
advisors closest to the President as “cabinet officers,” namely, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Justice. The historical foundation for what constitutes a cabinet
agency, however, is not quite as intuitive.
Indeed, there is no explicit definition of the term “cabinet” in the Constitution, the United States Code, or the Code of Federal Regulations. There
are, however, a few clues as to the prerequisites for being a “cabinet officer.”
Title 3, Section 302 of the United States Code states that, in regard to presidential delegation of power, “nothing herein shall be deemed to require
express authorization in any case in which such an official would be presumed in law to have acted by authority or direction of the President.”83 This
passage implies that principal officers do not need to request their power to
act separately; rather, they may use power either expressly or implicitly delegated by the President each time that power is utilized.84 This additionally
implies that being a principal officer is a prerequisite, although not the end
of the inquiry, to being a cabinet officer.
The initial use of the term “cabinet” dates back to the first President of
the United States, George Washington.85 President Washington’s Cabinet
82 See Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,
312 (1986) (“Above all, Chevron chastens the excessive intrusion of courts into the business
of agency policy-making. Policy, which is not the natural province of courts, belongs properly to the administrative agencies, and, ultimately, to the executive and legislature that
oversee them.”).
83 3 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (stating principal officials need not appeal to the President
each time they use generally delegated power).
84 The term “principal officer” is implicitly defined in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of
the Constitution:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
85 See Cabinet Members, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON, http://www.mount
vernon.org/educational-resources/encyclopedia/cabinet (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
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contained four members: Thomas Jefferson (Secretary of State), Alexander
Hamilton (Secretary of the Treasury), Henry Knox (Secretary of War), and
Edmund Randolph (Attorney General).86 Across centuries, the positions
within the President’s cabinet retain several common traits. First, each cabinet member is nominated by the President and then presented to the Senate
for confirmation (or rejection) by a simple majority vote.87 Second, all members of the cabinet receive the title of “Secretary.”88 Third, cabinet members
serve at the absolute pleasure of the President, meaning that the President
may dismiss them at any time, for any or no reason at all.89
Throughout the many presidencies that followed President Washington,
the President’s cabinet has grown to include several other cabinet officers,90
as well as “cabinet-level” (or “cabinet-rank”) positions.91 With history as a
guide, there seems to be three options in defining “cabinet” agencies. First,
one may use the original four cabinet agencies under President Washington.
Second, one may use the current cabinet agencies under President Obama
(fifteen executive departments). Third, one may use the fifteen executive
departments and seven cabinet-level positions under President Obama.
Including the seven cabinet-level positions within the definition of “cabinet agencies” raises implicit problems, as the White House Chief of Staff is
technically the highest-ranking employee in the White House and not a principal officer under the Constitution. The first option seems equally implausible, as it accurately reflects neither the current way in which the President
defines her own cabinet, nor the way in which the public generally views the
cabinet. Therefore, this Note will proceed to define “cabinet agencies” as the
fifteen executive departments under the current President’s control.
86 Id.
87 See supra note 85.
88 One notable exception is the head of the Department of Justice, who is referred to
as the “Attorney General.”
89 This distinction, at its core, is what separates principal officers from inferior officers
or employees of the President. The cabinet is very much the public face of the President’s
policy initiatives. Therefore, the President must have the ability to control her cabinet,
which necessarily entails the ability to fire cabinet members at will.
90 President Obama’s Cabinet includes fifteen departments: Department of State,
Department of the Treasury, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department
of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of
Labor, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Department of Transportation, Department of Energy, Department of Education, Department of Veterans Affairs, and Department of Homeland Security. The Cabinet, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/cabinet (last visited
Oct. 10, 2014).
91 Cabinet-rank positions and agencies as of the Obama Administration include: the
White House Chief of Staff, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Office of Management and Budget, the United States Trade Representative, the United States Mission to the
United Nations, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Small Business Administration.
Id.
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CABINET AGENCIES

With the Chevron decision contextualized and cabinet agencies defined,
it is now time to turn to why Chevron deference is better suited for cabinet
agencies than independent agencies. Making a compelling case for Chevron
deference requires both a theoretical and practical justification. Part III proceeds with two theoretical justifications and four practical justifications as to
why Chevron deference is more applicable to cabinet agencies.
A.

The Theoretical Justification

The theoretical justification for why Chevron deference is more applicable to cabinet agencies is similar to why Chevron deference should be applied
across-the-board as opposed to on a case-by-case basis.92 First, the judiciary’s
Marbury v. Madison power to “say what the law is” exists against the backdrop
of the judiciary’s countermajoritarian difficulty.93
The countermajoritarian difficulty endures because the judiciary is the
only branch that is unelected, and therefore unaccountable, to the electorate.94 This is a burden that the judiciary alone must bear, and one that
unequivocally separates it from the executive and legislative branches.
The countermajoritarian difficulty, however, does not delegitimize the
judiciary’s traditional function to “say what the law is.” Rather, it forces the
judiciary to base its jurisprudence on decisions of law, not policy.95 Interpretation of law is the exclusive domain of the judiciary, and a domain for which
it is well suited. With that said, the countermajoritarian difficulty comes back
into focus when the judiciary decides cases based on judicial policy preferences rather than the law.96 It is this dilemma that Chevron deference specifically counteracts.97
92 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
93 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); supra notes 9 and 14 and
accompanying text. The countermajoritarian difficulty, at its core, is a problem with the
institution of judicial review. When unelected judges use their power of judicial review to
nullify the actions and decisions of elected executives or legislators, they inherently act
contrary to the collective desire of the American people, as articulated by their political
representatives. This overruling of the “majority will” seems appropriate when the judiciary decides a question of law, as that is its domain and area of expertise, but not when it
decides a question of policy, for that is the domain and expertise of the elected branches.
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.) (“Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we
possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the
people disagree with them. It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences
of their political choices.”).
94 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
95 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
96 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
97 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Under the Chevron two-step framework,
the judiciary must abide by an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.
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Under pre-Chevron jurisprudence, as Justice Stevens articulated, judges
would often insert their own judicial preferences in the place of statutory
ambiguity from Congress.98 This approach is fundamentally mistaken.
When Congress delegates power to agencies, it delegates power to agencies,
not to the judiciary. Post-Chevron, Congress legislates against the proper
backdrop that ambiguities in statutes will be interpreted utilizing the Chevron
two-step framework. If Congress dislikes how an agency interprets a statutory
ambiguity, it can amend the statute in question.99 The post-Chevron framework simultaneously vindicates the judiciary’s power to “say what the law is”
and maintains the executive’s and legislature’s respective abilities to make
policy decisions, as they were elected (and are held accountable) to do.100
As Chief Justice Roberts implicitly noted in his majority opinion in Sebelius v.
National Federation of Independent Businesses: The executive and legislature can
be thrown out. The judiciary cannot.101
Second, the text of the Chevron opinion itself supports a broad interpretation of its applicability to agencies (including cabinet agencies). As noted
previously, Justice Scalia often reminds the Court that the text of the Chevron
holding is written in broad and general language, which is not cabined to the
precise case at issue.102 An examination of Justice Stevens’s pivotal paragraph in Chevron, defining the two-step framework, supports this view:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). The
Chevron framework implicitly prevents the judiciary from crafting its own policy prescriptions to fill the gaps left by Congress.
98 See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
99 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
100 While this Note pays particular attention to the problematic nature of the judiciary
usurping policymaking power, siphoning it away from the executive and legislative
branches, it is similarly problematic for the legislature to burden (or “punt” to) the judiciary with politically contentious decisions that should be made by elected and accountable
officials. As one example, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165–66 (1973), weighed into the
contentious and politically charged debate over whether a woman has a fundamental right
to an abortion. Id. In the absence of clear congressional action on the subject, the judiciary formulated an awkward trimester framework that reads more like judicial legislation
than a judicial opinion. Id. at 164–65. Indeed, the trimester-based framework eventually
became unworkable due to advances in medical technology and had to be amended by
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, which dispensed with the trimester framework in favor of an “undue burden” standard. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, J.J.).
101 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
102 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Again, admittedly, Justice Scalia’s view
often comes up in concurrences and dissents, but it is not all that uncommon for his viewpoints to become the majority, especially in the context of administrative law. See William
K. Kelley, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Long Game, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1601, 1604 (2012)
(“From the beginning of his time on the Court, Justice Scalia has been playing the long
game. Slowly but surely, he has fundamentally transformed the terms of legal debate in
this country—in the courts, in the academy, and in the political process.”).
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When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.103

Justice Stevens’s language is sweeping and broad. It is not cabined to
certain agencies or agency decisions with regard to ambiguous statutes.
Additionally, Chevron contained no concurrences or dissents: all six justices
agreed to it (three took no part in the decision).104 Critiques such as those
Justice Breyer offers seem to be attempts at revisionist history, a plea to
return to the pre-Chevron framework that granted the judiciary power to dictate policy in the face of congressional ambiguity.105
Admittedly, some post-Chevron cases, and Mead in particular, seem to be
sympathetic toward Justice Breyer’s view and attempt to cabin the applicability of Chevron deference.106 But if Justice Stevens’ words in the Chevron opinion are to be taken seriously, then it must be read as the broad opinion that it
was. If not, it would seem rather disingenuous for the Court to announce
that “[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress” and
then only apply that theoretical rationale to certain circumstances that the
judiciary deems appropriate.107 The theoretical rationale of the Chevron twostep framework is one that demands application across the board. Again,
Justice Scalia often notes: “While Chevron in fact involved an interpretive regulation, the rationale of the case was not limited to that context.”108
To summarize, the theoretical justification for Chevron’s applicability to
cabinet agencies is twofold. First, the judiciary’s proper role is arbiter of law,
not policy. In the face of congressional ambiguity, cabinet agencies must
have the ability to dictate a policy path of their choosing, as they are closest
to the electorate and accountability. Second, the Chevron opinion itself was
written in broad and general language. If the text of the opinion is to have
meaning, it must be interpreted in an across-the-board fashion and applied
to cabinet agencies.
103 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(citations omitted).
104 Id. at 839.
105 See supra notes 52–64 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
107 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (citation omitted).
108 Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The Practical Justification

There are four main practical justifications for why Chevron deference is
more applicable to cabinet agencies than to independent agencies: (i) political accountability and presidential prerogative; (ii) agility and quickness to
respond to national security matters; (iii) inherent expertise and technical
advantage; and (iv) the encouragement of careful statutory drafting by Congress. Each practical justification is discussed in turn.
1.

Political Accountability and Presidential Prerogative

Beginning with the basic premise that interpretive decisions of ambiguous statutes, at their core, are decisions of policy, it follows that the elected
and politically accountable branches should be left to make these policy decisions.109 Cabinet agencies are visible and vocal conduits of the President’s
policy on a variety of fronts: foreign affairs, national security, and healthcare
regulation, among others.110 Although not directly accountable to the voters
themselves, these cabinet heads are but one step away from direct accountability to the President, and able to be fired by the President at will.111 The
President knows that unwise political and policy choices by cabinet heads will
have an adverse effect on the viability of both the President’s re-election
chances and the political capital necessary to accomplish the President’s policy goals. It is for this reason that the President’s cabinet must have the political ability to interpret ambiguous statutes enacted by Congress.112 If the
populous disagrees with the cabinet agency’s interpretation, then the President can fire the cabinet head, or the President can be thrown out.113
Any interpretive decision by cabinet agencies undeniably has an aspect
of political calculation and policy choice. Such judgments are the province
of the executive and congressional branches, but not the judicial branch.
109 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2587 (“[I]nterpretation of statutes often calls for
technical expertise, and here the executive has conspicuous advantages over the courts. . . .
When the executive is seeking to expand or limit the Endangered Species Act or deciding
whether to apply the Clean Air Act to greenhouse gases, democratic forces undoubtedly
play a significant role.”). But see Gary S. Lawson, Commentary, Reconceptualizing Chevron
and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1377, 1380 (1997) (“But
defining what counts as a ‘reasoned explanation’ for choosing from among a range of
permissible interpretations of a statute is a bit more complicated than it seems.”).
110 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2588–89 (“This argument [to apply Chevron deference]
applies most obviously to the national government, operated by the Chief Executive, who
stands as the most visible official in the United States.”).
111 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
112 See Starr, supra note 82, at 309 (“When Congress has not spoken to an issue, Chevron
forbids the courts to engage in supervisory oversight of the agencies. Ours [the judiciary’s
role] is not to supervise; that role is allotted to the political branches, those directly
accountable to the people. Chevron affirms that fundamental allocation of
responsibility.”).
113 See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885, 928 (2003) (“[I]t is not irrelevant that agencies are subject to a degree of democratic supervision.”).
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This fundamentally separates the executive from the judicial branch: it is the
duty of the executive to say what the policy is and the duty of the judiciary to
say what the law is.
2.

Agility and Quickness to Respond to National Security Matters

The ability to respond quickly and decisively to national security matters
has become increasingly important in the twenty-first century after the stark
events of September 11th, 2001, and its aftermath. It is for this reason that
the cabinet agencies, namely the Department of Defense and the State
Department, must have the ability to interpret a vague statute enacted by
Congress at a moment’s notice.
Allowing cabinet agencies to make these policy calls advances a swift
response to national security matters for two reasons. First, if the judiciary
must follow the Chevron two-step framework, then this reduces the likelihood
that such an interpretation by the agency will result in protracted litigation or
an abrupt change in policy dictated by the unelected judiciary.114 Second, if
appellate courts apply a Chevron presumption across the board, this reduces
the risk of potential circuit splits, which would also cause prolonged
litigation.115
3.

Inherent Expertise and Technical Advantage

Cabinet agencies are, at their core, individual departments within the
executive branch that focus on one particular aspect of the President’s policy
prerogatives. In comparison to the judiciary, which is composed of general
courts that must review cases across a wide spectrum of disciplines and subject matters, cabinet agencies deal with one particular aspect of the President’s policy agenda and solely focus on implementing that vision.116
Since Marbury v. Madison, our country placed the power of judicial
review within the judiciary, in part, due to the belief that the judiciary is the
branch best suited for that function.117 Analogously, cabinet agencies within
114 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2588 (“Deference to the executive reduces the likelihood that judicial disagreement will result in time-consuming remands to the agency for
further proceedings.”).
115 Id. (“[S]uch deference combats the risk that different lower courts will disagree
about the appropriate interpretation of statutes–and thus counteracts the balkanization of
federal law.”).
116 Id. at 2587 (“[I]nterpretation of statutes often calls for technical expertise, and here
the executive has conspicuous advantages over the courts. The question in Chevron itself
was highly technical, and it was difficult to answer that question without specialized
knowledge.”).
117 See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of
Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 14 (2005) (“Our
desire to have courts determine questions of law is related to a belief in their possession of
expertness in regard to such questions. It is from that very desire that the nature of questions of law emerges.” (quoting JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 152 (1938)
(emphasis omitted))).
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the executive branch are the governmental actors that are best suited to
interpret ambiguous statutes enacted by Congress, as cabinet agencies have a
distinct expertise and technical advantage in interpreting the statutes at
issue.118
4.

Encouragement of Careful Statutory Drafting by Congress

Post-Chevron, Congress knows that if it leaves statutory ambiguities in
place, it is implicitly delegating to agencies the authority to work through
those ambiguities.119 Additionally, Congress knows that the judiciary will
defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.120 If
Congress wishes to not leave such interpretive choices open to cabinet agencies, then it can either draft a precise statute from its inception or amend the
statute to essentially “overrule” the agency’s reasonable interpretation.121
Allowing cabinet agencies to reasonably interpret ambiguities in statutes both
encourages careful statutory drafting by Congress and allows cabinet agencies to quickly respond by interpreting ambiguities in the event of a pressing
national security concern.122
To summarize, there are four main practical justifications for why Chevron deference is more applicable to cabinet agencies than to independent
agencies: political accountability and presidential prerogative (the executive
is politically accountable, the judiciary is not); agility and quickness to
respond to national security matters (an increasingly necessary ability in a
post–September 11th world); inherent expertise and technical advantage
(agencies are specialists, while courts are necessarily generalists); and the
encouragement of careful statutory drafting by Congress (post-Chevron Congress remains in the driver’s seat of the administrative state train).
CONCLUSION
Cabinet agencies must, against the backdrop of often-ambiguous statutes, make daily policy choices that are frequently highly contentious and
politically charged. Cabinet agencies must “say what the policy is” from the
118 Id. (“One result of this Chevron induced shift of power to agencies within the Executive Branch . . . is that agency experts are making more policy decisions rather than agency
lawyers and federal courts.”); Lawrence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law &
Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 823 (1990) (“Chevron’s importance is its recognition
that, expertise aside, the agencies, nevertheless, maintain a comparative institutional
advantage over the judiciary in interpreting ambiguous legislation that the agencies are
charged with applying.”).
119 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
120 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
122 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2587 (“[T]he executive administers laws that apply
over extended periods and across heterogeneous contexts. Changes in both facts and values argue strongly in favor of considerable executive power in interpretation. Unlike the
executive, courts are too decentralized . . . to do the relevant ‘updating,’ or to adapt statutes to diverse domains.”).
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perspective of the executive branch. Such policy interpretations are the
exclusive domain of the electable and accountable branches. The elected
branches ability to “say what the policy is” does not conflict with the judiciary’s Marbury v. Madison ability to “say what the law is,” as questions of policy
and questions of law are two separate inquiries that should be decided by the
branches best suited to answer them: questions of policy by the executive and
legislative branches, and questions of law by the judiciary.
The theoretical justification for Chevron’s applicability to cabinet agencies is twofold. First, the judiciary’s proper role is arbiter of law, not policy.
In the face of congressional ambiguity, cabinet agencies must have the ability
to dictate a policy path of their choosing, as they are closest to the electorate
and accountability. Second, the Chevron opinion itself was written in broad
and general language. If the text of the opinion is to have meaning, it must
be interpreted in an across-the-board fashion and applied to cabinet
agencies.
The practical justification for Chevron’s applicability to cabinet agencies
is fourfold. First, cabinet agencies are politically accountable and serve the
prerogative of the President. Any interpretive decision by cabinet agencies
undeniably has an aspect of political calculation and policy choice. Second,
cabinet agencies must be agile and quick to respond to national security matters in a post–September 11th world. It is for this reason that cabinet agencies, namely the Department of Defense and the State Department, must
have the ability to interpret a vague statute enacted by Congress at a
moment’s notice. Third, cabinet agencies are best suited to interpret ambiguous statutes enacted by Congress, as cabinet agencies have a distinct expertise and technical advantage in interpreting the statutes at issue over
generalist courts. Fourth, by allowing cabinet agencies to reasonably interpret ambiguities in statutes, this both encourages careful statutory drafting by
Congress, and also allows cabinet agencies to quickly respond by interpreting
ambiguities in the event of a pressing national concern.
Cabinet agencies are better suited to receive Chevron deference than
independent agencies, because voters should desire for such policy decisions
to be made by those closest to electoral accountability rather than unelected
Article III judges with life-tenure. The judiciary should accept the countermajoritarian difficulty as fundamentally true and review cabinet agency decisions in light of Chevron deference.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL109.txt

418

unknown

Seq: 22

notre dame law review

2-DEC-14

8:51

[vol. 90:1

